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FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT IN ADJUDICATION:
A LOOK THROUGH THE LENS OF
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY*

Dan Simon'

INTRODUCTION

One of the most apparent benefits of A ClearingIn The
Forest: Law, Life, and Mind is the wealth of insights that
emerge from its novel introduction of cognitive science as the
prism through which to analyze law. This tour de force of the
interrelationship between human cognition and the legal
system settles and redefines some old questions, as it spurs
new ones. Throughout the book, Steven Winter presses the
vital and oft-ignored point that law is, and cannot be anything
but, the creation of human minds; legal materials do not
answer legal questions, people do.' To better understand the
legal system, we are advised to relax the conventional
fascination with what the law is or should be, and start
examining more seriously (inter alia, empirically) how we do
what we do when we engage in legal thinking. This is a shift in
focus away from legal and theoretical metastructures (or the
lack thereof) to the cognitive and cultural infrastructures that
facilitate the creation and operation of law.2
* @2002 Dan Simon. All Rights Reserved.

t Associate Professor, University of Southern California Law School. I thank
the participants of this conference for their helpful comments. Thanks go also to Ron
Garet, Keith Holyoak, Tom Lyon, and Dan Krawczyk, to my research assistants Dave
Shraga and Daniel Weinstein, and to the diligent staff at the library of USC Law
School. This research was supported by NSF grants SES-0080424 and SES-0080375.
'STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 153,
317 (2001).
2Id. at3, 11.
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A ClearingIn The Forest devotes special attention to the
question of freedom and constraint in adjudication, offering
both critical and constructive headways in this perennially
befuddling conundrum. Foremost, the cognitive perspective
demonstrates the infeasibility of strong forms of rationality
that dominate much of legal thinking. Legal reasoning cannot
be objective, literal, linear, propositional or hierarchical, nor
can it be the product of top-down reasoning. This "rationalist
model" 3-the book's principal, but by no means only, foil-does
not capture the way the mind works and it does not correspond
to the types of legal questions that warrant serious attention.
However, Winter insists, repudiating the conventional model of
rationality is no reason to endorse its antithesis, radical
indeterminacy. Thus Winter criticizes the "excluded middle" in
legal scholarship,4 and attempts to pour content into this void.
His project aspires to free legal scholarship from the deadlock
of objectivist and subjectivist claims, striving instead towards
an understanding of law as a relatively regular, systematic
and, in some senses, predictable social practice. Judged from
this third .position, legal reasoning is viewed as neither an
instantiation of rationalism nor as an utter failure to measure
up to that untenable standard. Indeed, critical legal
scholarship fares no better under Winter than does
Langdellian formalism.
In chapter 6 of A ClearingIn The Forest, Winter offers a
re-conception of the debate over freedom and constraint in
adjudication. He discusses a Supreme Court opinion in which
the majority concludes that a string of precedent "speaks with
one voice" while the dissent insists that the conclusion
mischaracterizes the law.' Winter criticizes these types of allor-nothing clashes as a malady of the judicial culture, a
distortion borne by the adherence to the model of rationalism.
He argues that this seemingly irreconcilable indeterminacy can
be viewed as more orderly and predictable through the lens of
idealized cognitive models grounded in an experientially

'Id. at xiv, 43.
Id. at 158.
r The case discussed is Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Sers., 425 U.S. 18 (1980). The
case pertains to the right to appointed counsel in proceedings to terminate parental
rights.
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conceptualization of the debate and the corresponding
application of cognitive research, one cannot overstate the
value of showing that freedom and constraint are not essential
characteristics of the legal materials. The debate is better
understood once we incorporate the implicit models of human
cognition and cast it as a lack of fit between the "professed and
experienced' accounts of the judicial process. As Winter
correctly observes, legal reasoning is unavoidably influenced by
the structure and functioning of the mind: "because law is a
product of human minds, it displays all the regularities both of
the structure and of context-dependence predicted by cognitive
theory.'
In this Article, I follow Winter's endeavor of identifying
the imprints the cognitive system leaves on legal reasoning.
This approach should be distinguished from a familiar view in
legal scholarship that places a premium on the actors' internal
accounts of their performance rather than on external
observations. For example, H.L.A. Hart contests that it is only
from the internal perspective of the judge that one can
comprehend the judicial practice. The external perspective
precludes a true understanding of the '"hole distinctive style
of human thought, speech and action" involved in the practice
Along similar lines, Ronald Dworkin insists that a valid
WINTER, supranote 1, at 140-44.

Id.at 165.
Id. at 314.
9 Hart points out that one can observe a practice from the outside, as in
watching a traffic light changing colors and patterns of traffic flow, or one can
participate in the practice from within, sitting behind the driving wheel and reacting to
traffic light signals out of a sense of conformity and obligation to the rules of the road.
Hart depicts the external view as one that is
like the view of one who, having observed the working of a traffic
signal in a busy street for some time, limits himself to saying that
when the light turns red there is a high probability that the traffic
will stop. He treats the light merely as a natural sign that people will
behave in certain ways, as clouds are a sign that rain will come. In so
doing he will miss out a whole dimension of the social life of those
whom he is watching, since for them the red light is not merely a sign
that others will stop: they look upon it as a signal for them to stop,
and so a reason for stopping inconformity to rules which make
stopping when the light is red a standard of behaviour and an
obligation.
H.L.A. HART,THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-90 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
8
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account must be constructed entirely from within the internal
perspective of law, based on "the truth of certain propositions
that are given sense only by and within the practice.""0 Like the
perspective adopted in A Clearing In The Forest, the research
reported here is decidedly inconsistent with this view. It
focuses on the decision-maker's mental processes and examines
them through the lens of cognitive psychology.
The first part of the Article is primarily expository.
It
identifies two accounts of a legal question decided by a court:
the one observed by an onlooker and the other conveyed by the
judges through the narratives of the opinion. I characterize the
former as openness and the latter as closure.
The second part of the Article offers an empirical
explanation of the closure professed in judicial opinions. I agree
with Winter that legal materials are mentally represented in a
cognitive model that ultimately directs the decision in the case.
Winter portrays a supple cognitive system that can embody
any number of cognitive mechanisms, including basic-level
categorization, conceptual metaphor, metonymy, imageschemas, idealized cognitive models and radial categories."
Missing from his account, however, are the processes or
mechanisms by which multiple, conflicting, and ambiguous
arguments are integrated into discrete models. I present
experimental work in cognitive psychology that addresses this
missing link. The results of this research manifest general
cognitive phenomena that have important implications for
judicial reasoning. Most notable is the observed bi-directional
reasoning processes that tend to impose coherence on the
mental representation of the task, so that while the legal
materials do in fact influence the choice of the verdict,
coherence-driven processes generate global pressures that
apply back onto the legal materials thus creating coherence
with the emerging verdict. In other words, the cognitive
mechanisms operate to create a lopsided view of the case that
provides stronger argumentative support than the legal
materials would otherwise provide. As a result, judges
genuinely report a sense of closure that seems spurious to the

'0 RONALD DWORKIN,

LAW'S EMPIRE 13, 14 (1986).

1 WINTER, supra note 1, at 6.
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critic. In the third part of the Article I will briefly discuss some
important issues that emerge from the experimental findings.
I.

IDENTIFYING FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT

This part provides a descriptive framework intended to
offer a particular vantage point of the debate over freedom and
constraint in adjudication. The framework is based on a close
and detailed examination of the arguments that constitute the
opinions.' The purpose of this micro-analysis is to provide two
accounts of an appellate legal case: the first demonstrates the
existence and extent of the contrariness inherent in appellate
cases, that is, the openness of the legal materials; the second
demonstrates the absolute lack of contrariness conveyed in the
opinions, in other words, the strong sense of closure professed
by judges. Closure is manifested by the uniform and abundant
argumentative support for the chosen decision, in the sense of
inevitability of the outcome, the strong confidence in the
outcome and, as discussed below, in the implicit sense of
unidirectionality-thatis, that the inferences flow exclusively
from the legal materials towards the judicial conclusion. In
other words, unidirectionality implies that the decision is
determined by the materials, and the decision has no effect on
the way the legal materials are selected, interpreted, or
applied. I suggest that the discrepancy between the accounts of
openness and closure is key to the proposed understanding of
the freedom and constraint debate.
The case that will serve as an example is Rogers v.
Tennessee, recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 3 The
It should be noted that this analysis does not depend on the assumption that
the written judicial opinion is (or should be) an actual account of the mental processes
involved in reaching the decision. Over and above presenting the legal arguments that
support the decision, opinions are written also to persuade readers, co-opt other judges
into joining the decision, develop legal doctrine, and establish judicial reputations. I
have argued elsewhere that, however imperfect, judicial opinions provide an adequate
and rich source of information for the purpose of this kind of analysis. See Dan Simon,
A Psychological Model of Judicial Reasoning, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 34-38 (1998)
[hereinafter PsychologicalModel].
13 532 U.S. 451 (2001). It is important to note that the
following analysis can
be made of virtually any appellate case. Rogers is a convenient example because of its
relative simplicity and brevity. This case is also suitable for the current purposes in
that it cuts across the paradigmatic ideological line that divides the Court. The
12

1102

BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 67: 4

case concerned the conviction of the petitioner for second
degree murder for stabbing a person with a butcher knife.
Following surgery, the victim fell into a prolonged coma and
died fifteen months later from a kidney infection, a common
complication for comatose patients. Rogers appealed his
conviction, arguing that under Tennessee common law, a
murder charge cannot be sustained if the victim does not die
within a year and a day from the time of the assault. Affirming
the conviction, the Supreme Court of Tennessee abolished the
"year and a day" rule over Rogers' claim that this abolition
infringed upon due process and violated the Ex Post Facto
clauses of state and federal constitutions. Affirming the state
court's decision, Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Souter.
The principal dissent was written by Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Stevens and Thomas. The dissent was joined in part
also by Justice Breyer.
A.

Openness

The first observation concerns the extent of conflict and
ambiguity that pervade the legal materials discussed in this
case. The decision revolved around five principal issues:
whether the Ex Post Facto doctrine is separable from due
process; whether the Ex Post Facto prohibition is limited only
to "unexpected and indefensible" changes; whether the Ex Post
Facto prohibition is applicable to changes by the judiciary;
whether the "year and a day" rule was valid law in Tennessee;
and whether appellant Rogers was actually deprived of fair
warning. Each of these five issues had some inferential
implication for the outcome of the decision. As depicted in
Figure 1,14 every one of these issues contains two opposing

propositions, each of which supports either one of the decisions.

observations made from this case are typically more pronounced in longer and more
complex cases. For a similar analysis of a slightly longer case of Ratzlaf v. U.S., see
Simon, PsychologicalModel, supranote 12, at 62-72.
14 In these diagrams, each boxed statement
represents a proposition; solid
arrows represent positive inferences; dashed arrows denote contradictory propositions.
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For example, the proposition "Ex Post Facto prohibition is not
applicable to courts" has a supportive implication for the
decision to affirm Rogers' conviction, whereas the contradictory
proposition "Ex Post Facto prohibition is applicable to courts"
15
has a supportive implication for overturning the conviction.
To be sure, each of the five conclusions depicted in
Figure 1 is based on a more detailed set of arguments. Figure 2
depicts the important parts of chains of argumentation that are
presented in both the majority and the dissenting opinion with
respect to one of the five issues-the applicability of the Ex
Post Facto prohibition to courts. The chain on the left part of
the diagram contains some of the arguments made by Justice
O'Connor in support of the proposition that the prohibition
does not apply to courts, and by implication, that Rogers'
conviction should be affirmed.16 The chain on the right side of
the chart presents the dissenting justices' central arguments in
support of the proposition that the prohibition is indeed
applicable to courts, which in turn, also
supports the
7
conclusion to overturn Tennessee's judgment.
The contrariness between the two opinions pervades a
wide range of issues, including numerous weighty ones that
extend well beyond the particular case. Amongst other points
of disagreement, the opinions offer discrepant readings of the
history of common law jurisprudence,18 and they differ also on
the correct reading of the constitutional language-where one

15It is important to appreciate the centrality of the two decision alternatives.
The five issues are weakly related to one another, or not directly related at all.
However, they are all connected indirectly through their implicational links with either
one of the central decision alternatives.
:6 Rogers, 532 U.S. at 455-59.
7 These diagrams include most, but not
all, of the arguments that are
included in the respective opinions. It is important to acknowledge that there is no
precise way to dissect a case and to distinguish the various components. Alternative
ways will always be possible; they should not, however, deviate substantially from
mapping presented here.
'8 Justice Scalia offers a detailed historical analysis of the status of common
law adjudication in the time of the framing, leading to the conclusion that courts were
not perceived then as being capable of "changing" the law. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 472-77.
Justice O'Connor's historical conclusion, on the other hand, is that due process did not
prohibit judicial evolution at the time of the framing any more than it does so today.
Id. at 462. Justice Scalia's historical analysis is too intricate and detailed to be
included in the diagram.

2002]

THE LENS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

1105

Figure 2. Is the Ex Post Facto Prohibition Applicable to Courts? Rogers v. Tennemsee, 532 US. 451 (2001). 1
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opinion sees circumvention of the constitution, the other sees
consistency with it. 9 The opinions also reach contradictory
conclusions on the institutional differences between courts and
legislatures; 0 on the reading of a crucial statement in the
central precedent of Bouie v. City of Columbia as either ratio
decidenci or as dicta; 21 and on the appropriateness of
evolutionary progress through retroactive change in common
law adjudication.'
Similarly, Figure 3 depicts the chains of argumentation
pertaining to another one of the five issues-whether appellant
Rogers was actually deprived of fair warning. The chain on the
left contains most of the arguments made in Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion while the opposite chain contains arguments
made by the dissenting justices in support of overturning
Tennessee's judgment.'
Here, too, the diagram conveys distinct conflict and
contradiction. Justice O'Connor follows the Tennessee court's
observation that the "day and a year rule" (abbreviated in the
diagrams as the "Rule") had been abolished in the "vast
majority" of states that had addressed it.2 Commenting that
common law courts frequently look to the decisions of other

'9 Justice O'Connor points out that because the Constitution explicitly applies
the Ex Post Facto prohibition only to legislatures, extending it to courts would amount
to a circumvention of the constitutional language. Id. at 460. Justice Scalia, on the
other hand, explains that such an extension would be consistent with the Constitution;
given the historical argument just mentioned, the omission as irrelevant to the current
issue. Id. at 477.
20 The majority emphasizes the differences between courts
and legislatures in
the context of changing law, suggesting that courts have less opportunity to abuse
their powers. Id. at 460-61. The dissent finds no difference between the institutions
and suggests that the powers of courts should be limited more than that of legislatures.
Id. at 478.
21The dissent insists the precedent of Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347
(1964), explicitly restricted Ex Post Facto changes by courts, whereas the majority
justices found this statement to be mere dicta. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459, 469.
22 Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460. Justice Scalia criticizes the majority
for failing to
distinguish between applying the common law to new factual situations and changing
the law itself. He also points out that even in civil cases changing the rules
retroactively is extremely rare. Id. at 471.
2 Id. at 460-64.
24Id. at 463.
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Figure 3. Did Rogers Receive Fair Warning? Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001)
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jurisdictions in determining the fate of their own common
law,' Justice O'Connor concludes that the Rule's sweeping
erosion is "surely relevant to whether the abolition of the rule
in a particular case can be said to be unexpected and
indefensible."26 Displaying skills of a devoted legal Realist,
Justice Scalia mocks the majority for the way the interjurisdictional comparison was framed. He questions whether it
should not count in the petitioner's favor that some states
chose not to address the Rule, some states addressed it but
elected not to change it, some states changed it legislatively,
and yet others changed it prospectively. 7 Commenting that
people need not apprise themselves of the status of the common
law in all fifty states in order to ensure that their conduct is
legal, Justice Scalia finds this comparative analysis
irrelevant. The majority opinion justifies the abolition of the
"year and a day" rule in that it is an arcane and outdated legal
principle. 9 In response, Justice Scalia reminds the Court that
there are many valid provisions of criminal law that are
couched in arcane terms. 0 Justice Scalia also characterizes the
Rule as an actual element of the crime,3 ' whereas Justice
O'Connor points out that it was never specified in the
Tennessee criminal code and that it was not really law at the
time Rogers committed the crime. 2
In addition to the contrary propositions found in the two
issues already discussed above, the opinions also reveal wide
gaps in interpretations on a relevant body of precedent; 3 the
relationship between due process and the Ex Post Facto
prohibition; 4 the principal elements of the doctrine governing
the prohibition of retroactive change; 3 the precedential status
25 Id.

at 464.
532 U.S. at 464.
d. at 479.

26Rogers,
27
28

Id.
Id. at 463.
"Id. at 479.
31 Rogers, 532 U.S at 468.
32Id. at 466.
Compare Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458-59, with Rogers, 532 U.S. 469-70 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
34Id.

36 CompareRogers, 532 U.S. at 457, 461, with Rogers, 532 U.S. 469-70 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).

20021

THE LENS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

1109

of the "year and a day" rule in Tennessee; 36 and-absent any
mention of the Bush v. Gore7 decision rendered four months
earlier-the
validity of a state court's interpretation of its state
38
law.
To sum up the first observation, real conflict and
contradiction pervade the legal question decided in this case.
On every turn, one finds inconsistent and even contradictory
understandings of the law, all of which seem somewhat
plausible in their own right.
B.

Professed Closure

The second observation concerns the remarkable sense
of closure conveyed in the opinions. As already seen from
Figures 2 and 3, each of the opinions endorses arrays of
arguments (in psychological terms, "inferences") all of which
support the respective result, and rejects or ignores all other
arguments that support the opposite decision. 9 The sheer
number of arguments incorporated in the opinions and the
uniformity of support they lend to the respective decisions is
astounding. As depicted in Figure 2, the majority's conclusion
that Ex Post Facto prohibitions are inapplicable to courts is
supported by all of the ten arguments that pertain to this
issue, whereas the opposite conclusion is supported by all eight
arguments offered in the dissenters' opinion." The arguments
supplied in each opinion are distinctly inconsistent with those
supplied by the other, and there are no less than five direct
contradictions (denoted by the dashed arrows) between the two
sets. Similarly, Figure 3 displays eight arguments offered by
the majority and thirteen arguments offered by the dissent,

16CompareRogers, 532 U.S. at 466, with Rogers, 532 U.S. 469, 480 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
531 U.S. 98 (2001).
38 Compare Rogers, 532 U.S. at 465-66, with Rogers, 532 U.S. at 469, 480
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 The fact that the justices disagree on virtually every issue raised in the
opinions does not mean that they agreed about nothing. One of the conventions of legal
argument is not to dwell on points that are in agreement. Still, the range of
disagreement is broad and deep.
There is more than one way to count the arguments. While objective
measures are unavailable, they are essential for the current discussion.
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again, all providing uniform support for the respective
conclusion.
Recall that these two figures capture only two out of the
five issues discussed in the case. The other three issues reveal
similar patterns of reasoning. Based on a conservative count,
the majority opinion-holding a mere seven pages in the
Supreme Court Reporter-includes no less than thirty-seven
arguments and twenty citations to case law that provide the
argumentative basis for the five basic conclusions that
ultimately support the respective decision. The most stark fact
is that every one of the inferences supports the respective
decisions. The opinion also repudiates, rejects or ignores
virtually every one of the arguments made by the dissenters. In
a similar fashion, the dissenting opinion presents a compelling
composition-at least thirty arguments and three cites to
precedents4 1 -every one of which supports the respective
decision.4 2
The incompatibility of the opinions is not lost on the
Justices. Rejecting the dissent's conclusion of a due process
violation, the majority emphatically states that there is
"nothing" to suggest that this occurred in this case.' What the
majority portrays as a routine decision that brings the common
law into conformity with "logic and common sense,"" the
dissent criticizes as a conclusion that no reasonable person
would imagine.4" The dissent also characterizes the decision as
"fundamentally unfair," a violation of "one of the most widely
held value-judgments in the entire history of human thought,"
and contrary to "the first principles of the social compact, and
to every principle of social legislation."" While the majority
41 The

dissent holds some eight pages in the Supreme Court Reporter, three of

which are devoted exclusively to the historical analysis. The historical analysis has not
been included in this discussion.
42 It is true that the number of arguments (or, inferences) identified here is
most likely larger than the number of arguments that were actually considered by the
justices as part of their decision-making process. Judges tend to "pad" or otherwise
embellish the written opinion after having made up their minds. This suggests that the
numbers noted here are inflated in relation to the arguments that "actually" counted.
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 467.
45 Id. at 462.
Id. at 478, 467 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46 Id.

at

468

(Scalia, J.,

dissenting)

GENERAL47PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 59 (1960)).

(quoting

JEROME

HALL,

Id. at 478 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 44, 282
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touts the decision as an instantiation of good policy, the dissent
fears that it could open the floodgates by validating "the
retroactive creation of many new crimes."48
The professed closure, then, conveys a strong sense of
constraint. The sheer quantity and perfect alignment of the
arguments in support of the chosen decision, coupled with the
implicit or explicit rejection of the arguments supporting the
alternative decision, do indeed make the decision seem
obviously correct, even inevitable.
C.

Openness v. Closure

In sum, the legal issues involved in Rogers v. Tennessee
harbor a considerable degree of openness, yet this openness is
entirely absent from the opinions.4 9 This discrepancy, I suggest,
lies at the heart of the contentious debate about freedom and
constraint, and it is a likely source for the critical energy
driving the controversy surrounding this jurisprudential
question. Critics are jarred, correctly I believe, by the
coexistence of openness and closure. How is it possible, one
might well wonder, that judges report being so strongly
constrained by the legal materials when this professed
inevitability dissipates-indeed, is turned on its head-as soon
as one turns the page (or shifts the glance to the other side of
the diagram) and notices that the opposite opinion reports
inevitability and constraint based on an equally compelling
array of contradictory arguments. Furthermore, how is it
possible that every single one of the arguments cited in each
opinion is taken to support the corresponding decision? When
making decisions in our personal lives, we should be so lucky to
have thirty arguments line up in support of one course of
action with no good reason opposing it. Upon close review of
the professed closure, one sees that there is no scheme of
principle underlying the alignments of arguments; rather, they
appear to be an ad hoc assortment of propositions bound only
(James Madison)).
48
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 480 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4"There is nothing unique in this regard about Rogers v. Tennessee. Virtually
every non-unanimously decided appellate case contains a high degree of openness
while the opinions convey a distinct sense of closure.
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by the superficial feature that they happen to lend
argumentative support to the same outcome in a specific case.
Indeed, the sense is that something is amiss in the constraint
judges report: it seems that the professed constraints are
somehow imposed upon the legal materials.
This suspicion has been exaggerated, if not
misinterpreted, by the judiciary's critics. First, critics tend to
charge that to some degree at least, judges are conscious of
their misrepresentation." I argue below for an alternative
understanding of the professed constraint, based on the
observation that closure is imposed by the cognitive system
and that judges are not aware of this phenomenon. Second,
some critics charge that since legal questions like Rogers v.
Tennessee are so fraught with gaps and ambiguities, judges are
free to decide whatever they like. This, I believe, is an
overstatement of judicial freedom. Rather than concluding that
the range of choices is indefinite or even large, the more
sustainable inference is that there is much contradiction
among the few (usually two) plausibly available alternatives.5 '
Thus, the observation of wide openness should be taken to
stand only for the claim that there is considerable room for
judicial discretion in choosing between the 5two
alternative
2
decisions ultimately available for consideration.
The explanation offered here is that professed
constraint is a phenomenon of the cognitive processes that
make such decision making tasks feasible. However brief and
straightforward by comparison to most Supreme Court cases,
Rogers contains a fair degree of complexity. It requires
evaluating and integrating five different and incommensurable
For more on these phenomenological aspects, see infra Part III. B.
51 This view, rather than unfettered discretion, is the more powerful of
the
Realists critiques. See Gregory Keating, Fidelity and Pre-Existing Law and the
Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 51 (1993); Joseph W. Singer,
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467-75 (1988). Similarly, Richard Posner
explains that legal materials that do not lean so strongly in one direction so as to make
one decision unreasonable, "merely narrow the range of permissible decision, leaving
open an area within which the judge must perforce attempt to decide the case in
accordance with sound policy." RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS WITH JURISPRUDENCE
131 (1990).
52 In other words, the term indeterminacy is better understood
as a form of
underdeterminacy. The taxonomy of indeterminacy and underdeterminacy is borrowed
from Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing CriticalDogma, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1987).
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issues, each of which contains conflict and ambiguity. This is a
daunting task for any computational system. The human
cognitive system should be appreciated for its capability to
engage in such tasks and bring them to conclusion; however, it
must also be appreciated that the process does not occur by the
grace of an invisible mind. Rather, it requires arduous
processing by cognitive mechanisms, and these processes leave
their imprints on the result. The most notable phenomenon is
that during the process, the cognitive system dynamically
changes the evaluations of the arguments leading towards a
strong endorsement of one set of arguments and a rejection of
the competing set. These changes are the cause for the strong
dominance that emerges at the end of the decision.
In psychological terms, the observations of closure are
captured by the term coherence, that is, a mental state in
which concepts that "go together" are similarly activated. Thus,
a coherent state is one in which the arguments that support
the chosen conclusion are strongly endorsed while those that
support the rejected decision receive weak or negative
endorsement. As used here, coherence is a positive term that
describes the relationship amongst parts of a set, rather than
as a desideratum of a jurisprudential theory. 3 The
phenomenon of coherence, I would argue, plays an important
role both in the way judges make legal decisions and in the
way their work is understood by their audiences-proponents
and critics alike.
II.

EMPIRICAL SUBSTANTIATION OF COHERENT EFFECTS

In this part of the Article I will describe a series of
experiments in cognitive psychology performed by Keith
Holyoak and myself." The experiments were designed to
examine the process that governs mental tasks that require

Cf DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 236-37; Rolf Sartorious, Social Policy and

JudicialLegislation, 8 A. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 151 (1971).
See Keith. J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision
Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. GEN. 3 (1999); Dan Simon et
al., The Emergence of Coherence Over. the Course of Making a Decision, 27 J. OF ExP.
PSYCHOL.-LEARNING, MEMORY AND COGNITION 1250 (2001) [hereinafter Emergence of
Coherence].
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integrating multiple, ambiguous, and conflicting components
into discrete choices.
A.

TheoreticalBackground: ConnectionistRepresentations
and ConstraintSatisfactionMechanisms

Before presenting the experimentation, it would be
helpful to spell out the theoretical underpinning of this project.
The research reported here is theoretically based on
connectionist systems for the cognitive representation of the
tasks and on constraint satisfaction mechanisms for their
processing." These theories, deemed the new version of Gestalt
theory,5 6 are characterized by their fluidity, flexibility, and
context sensitivity. These properties enable the connectionist
framework to realistically capture the processes by which
people perform a variety of complex mental tasks. Constraint
satisfaction models have strong parallels with the family of
theories of cognitive consistency,57 which were developed in
social psychology under the Gestalt influence.58 The interactive
activation model of letter and word perception59 and
subsequent computational constraint satisfaction models

For an excellent review of these concepts, see Stephen J. Read et al.,
Connectionism, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Processes and Gestalt Principles: (Re)
Introducing Cognitive Dynamics to Social Psychology, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV., 26-53 (1997).
See Steven Palmer, Gestalt Psychology Redux, in SPEAKING MINDS:
INTERVIEWS WITH TWENTY EMINENT COGNITIVE SCIENTISTS 157 (Peter Baumgartner &

Sabine Payr eds., 1995).
Cognitive consistency theories, which were applied to attitude and belief
revision, include balance theory, see Fritz Heider, Attitudes and Cognitive
Organization,21 J. OF PSYCHOL., 107-111 (1946); FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); cognitive dissonance theory, see LEON FESTINGER,
A THEORY OF COGNITivE DISSONANCE (1957); and symbolic psycho-logic, see Robert P.

Abelson & Milton Rosenberg, Symbolic psycho-logic: A model of Attitudinal Cognition,
3 BEHAV. SC., 1-8 (1958).
68For a critical historical discussion of cognitive consistency theories, see Dan
Simon & Keith J. Holyoak, Structural Dynamics of Cognition: From Consistency

Theories to Constraint Satisfaction, __

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.

__

(forthcoming 2002).
J. L. McClelland, & D. E. Rumelhart, An Interactive Model of Context
Effects in Letter Perception: I. An Account of Basic Findings, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 375407 (1981).
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developed by Holyoak and Thagard ° provide the basis for the
cognitive research presented below.
The representation of a complex task, such as deciding a
legal dispute, can be imagined as an intricate electrical
network, in which numerous facts, values, principles, and
concepts are represented as elements, or nodes. This
representation is determined by the rich and detailed
background store of knowledge about one's legal, social, and
conceptual worlds. Each element begins with an initial
activation, that corresponds to the degree of the respective
element's acceptability, in other words, the strength of the
respective argument represented by these elements. Activation
levels can be positive or negative and they vary in intensity.
Elements are connected to other elements by inferential links.
Links can be either positive or negative, denoting whether the
connected elements support or contradict one another. The
strength of the links varies according to the nature of the
association between the elements. Thus, every linked element
stands for an inferential relationship. At the central junctions
of the network are a pair of vying alternatives (for convenience,
assume only two alternatives). Option A is supported by some
of the elements (a, a,...a.), and some elements (b,, b2 ... b.)
support the opposite option B. In all but the simplest of
decisions, no one element is independently capable of
determining the outcome of the process. Each inference is
better viewed as a "constraint" on the system; the inferences
constrain other inferences and are constrained by them in

return."
It is not difficult to see how a legal controversy can be
represented as a connectionist network. Each one of the
plausible arguments presented to the judge can be viewed as a
constraint on the network. Numerous arguments lend
argumentative support through chains of inference to either
one of the alternatives. In the Rogers case, for example, the
proposition that Bouie's restriction of judicial change was mere
60See Keith J. Holyoak & Paul Thagard, Analogical Mapping by Constraint
Satisfaction, 13 CoG. Sci. 295-355 (1989); Paul Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, 12
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 435-67 (1989).
6' Note that the term "constraint" as used in the
context of constraint
satisfaction mechanisms is conceptually dissimilar from the formulation of freedom
and constraint as used in the debate about the judicial function.
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dicta lends argumentative support to the majority's decision,
while the proposition that it was ratio decidenci lends support
to the dissent's conclusion, and both propositions inhibit one
another. Likewise, the proposition that Rogers' conduct was
criminal at the time it was committed supports affirming the
conviction, while the proposition that the year and a day rule
was an element of the crime supports the dissent, and both
propositions negatively constrain one another. The daunting
task of the cognitive system, then, is to process this complex
and conflict-laden task in a way that will yield a discrete choice
between the two vying verdicts.
Constraint satisfaction mechanisms operate through a
process of cross-activation of the elements. Each element
induces the activation of all other elements to which it is
connected. The cross-activations depend on the elements'
relative initial levels of activation, and on the strength and
sign of the link that connects them. Supportive elements excite
one another, whereas contradictory elements inhibit each
other. Since each element is typically connected to a number of
elements, activation spreads through adjacent elements and
thus permeates the cognitive structure. As the process
progresses, elements are influenced by other elements in
parallel, resulting in changes in the levels of their activation,
which in turn lead to slightly different cross-activations. Over
time, elements that are not supported or are suppressed by
other elements wane, and those that are supported become
more active.
Ultimately, these repeated interactions asymptote at an
equilibrium of maximal satisfaction, given the initial
constraints. At this point of equilibrium, one subset of
elements, say a,, a,,...a., becomes highly activated and the
other subset is inhibited. A state in which positively associated
elements share similar levels of acceptability-with "winning"
elements being positively activated and "losing" elements being
negatively activated-amounts to a state of coherence. It is of
crucial importance that since coherence is not spontaneously
extant in the initial representation of a difficult decision,
cognitive work must be performed to attain it. Thus, constraint
satisfaction mechanisms impose a coherence-maximizing order
on the sets. Cognitive forces push backwards, so to speak, from
the global level towards the individual elements, forcing them
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to change towards a state of coherence. A central tenet of this
cognitive paradigm is that the attainment of coherence entails
a reconstruction of the initial representation, a shift from a
state of openness to one of closure.62
One way to explain the tendency towards coherence is
that it serves the simplification motive-a ubiquitous feature of
the cognitive system of promoting cognitive economy.
Structuring complex cognitive sets into tightly-bound, coherent
representations serves to reduce the quantity and complexity of
the information involved in thought processes. Coherent
structures are likely to be easiest to process, memorize, and
communicate to others.63 Indeed, our experiments made direct
findings to this effect."
B.

The CoherenceExperiments - Quest v. Smith

1. Method
The experiments were designed to examine the
cognitive processing of a complicated decision that contains a
high level of conflict and ambiguity. Participants in these
experiments were asked to evaluate a set of arguments that
share no apparent relationship, first in isolation, and later in
the context of a legal case. The first phase consisted of a dozen
vignettes, each of which was followed by a statement that could
See Barbara A. Spellman et al., A Coherence Model of Cognitive
Consistency: Dynamics of Attitude Change During the Persian Gulf War, 49 J. OF SOC.
ISSUES 147-65 (1993).

See, e.g., Steven Neuberg & Jason Newsom, Personal Need for Structure:
Individual Differences in the Desire for Simple Structures, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 113, 113-14 (1993). In this regard, the tendency towards coherence seems to

serve a similar function to the cognitive feature of categorization, by which people
divide the world in a way that maximizes intra-category similarity and minimizes
inter-category similarity. See Edward Smith, Concepts and Reasoning, in AN
INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THINKING 3 (Edward Smith & Daniel N. Osherson

eds., 2d ed. 1995); see also Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization,in COGNITION
AND CATEGORIZATION 27, 28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara L. Lloyd eds., 1978).

We found that coherence is imposed not only when participants engage in a
decision-making task, but also when they process a case for the sake of mere
memorization, learning, and preparation for communicating it to a third party. See
Simon et al., Emergence of Coherence,supra note 54.
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be inferred from the text. Participants were asked to rate their
agreement with each of these seemingly unrelated inferences,
using an 11-point scale ranging from -5 ("definitely disagree")
to + 5 ("definitely agree"), with a rating of 0 indicating
neutrality. For example, participants were given a technical
definition of a telephone system and asked to what extent the
Internet resembled a telephone system; in a separate vignette,
they were given a definition of a newspaper and were asked the
extent to which the Internet resembled a newspaper.'
Participants were told they were not expected to have any
expert knowledge, but were asked simply to use common sense
in making their ratings. This first phase was completed before
the participants were informed about the ensuing legal task.
After completing a distracter task, the second phase
was administered. Participants were presented with a fictitious
civil suit filed by a software company, Quest, against one of its
investors, Jack Smith. The evidence, which was not in dispute,
was that Quest's financial situation had been deteriorating for
some time and its management was having difficulty in coping
with the company's troubles. Smith, a dissatisfied shareholder,
posted a message that contained negative assertions about
Quest and its prospects for recovery on an electronic bulletin
board that was directed at investors. Shortly thereafter,
Quest's stock price plummeted and the company went
bankrupt. It was later revealed that the company had been
secretly developing a new product that could have saved the
company. Quest was suing Smith for libel, claiming that his
message caused the collapse of the company.
The case was designed to resemble the argumentative
structure of a relatively uncomplicated Supreme Court case
with six separate issues in dispute. Three issues involved
matters of fact: Quest argued that Smith's negative assertions
were untruthful, whereas Smith claimed they were all true;
Quest asserted that the message caused the company's
downfall, whereas Smith claimed that its collapse was caused
by its mismanagement; Quest claimed that Smith's action was
A telephone system was defined as "a network of interconnected lines used
to transmit and receive voice or data from one extension to one or more other
extensions." A newspaper was defined as "any publication intended for the distribution
and dissemination of news, facts or opinions to broad audiences."
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malevolent, whereas Smith claimed he aimed only to protect
other innocent investors. The remaining three points of
contention involved matters of law and legal policy: Quest
argued that as a matter of public policy, it is in society's
interest to regulate speech over the Internet, whereas Smith
argued that society would benefit from free speech over the
Internet; Quest claimed that in posting the message, Smith
had violated a company bylaw requiring prior notification of
management; Smith maintained that he had complied with the
bylaw. On the last issue, participants were informed that as a
matter of law, statements published in a newspaper are
normally subject to libel law, whereas utterances expressed
over a telephone are normally immune from liability for libel.
The plaintiff argued that the Internet is analogous to a
newspaper, whereas Smith argued that it is more like a
telephone system. The parties used the same legal definitions
of newspaper and telephone system as used in the vignettes. 66
In all, the case materials were designed to present sufficient
ambiguity so as to enable plausible arguments to be made by
both parties on each of the issues. The six points of dispute and
their relationship to the alternative verdicts are depicted in
Figure 4.
Participants were given as much time as they liked to
read the case. They were then asked to render a verdict and to
rate their confidence that they had made the best possible
verdict on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 ("low confidence") to 5
("high confidence"). Finally, participants completed the final
post-test measurement in which they were asked to rate their
agreement with each one of the arguments made by the
parties. An important aspect of the experimental design was
that the legal arguments were essentially identical in form and
wording as those used in the previous measure of the vignettes,
except that they were now embedded in the legal case.

"See supra note 65.
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67
2. Results

Participants were about evenly divided in their verdicts,
with twenty-six deciding in favor of the plaintiff Quest, and
twenty-two deciding in favor of the defendant Smith. Our first
theoretical observation concerned the levels of confidence
participants reported in their verdicts. One might have
expected that given the complexity and ambiguity that
pervaded the case (as evidenced by their evaluations at the
vignette phase, as discussed below), the participants would
encounter difficulty in deciding the case, and that they would
report low levels of confidence. Yet, as seen in Figure 5, the
distribution of reported confidence (along a scale ranging from
maximal confidence in one verdict to maximal confidence in the
other) follows a distinct bi-modal, rather than a normal
dispersion. Regardless of which verdict they chose, the
participants were highly confident that they had reached the
best possible decision. Seventy-five percent of participants
indicated that they had maximal (5) or next-to-maximal (4)
confidence in their verdicts; conversely, only five percent
indicated they had minimal (1) or next-to-minimal (2)
confidence. This combination of ambiguity and high confidence
in decisions is consistent with constraint-satisfaction models of
decision making, which tend to resolve ambiguous situations
by allowing one coherent set of beliefs to become highly
activated, while the other set becomes more inhibited.
The second question we addressed was whether the
process of reaching a verdict was accompanied by a change in
participants' assessments of the six points of dispute involved
in the case. Conventional theories of reasoning would predict
that people's evaluations of arguments would not change in
any systematic way from one measurement to the next. In
contrast, constraint satisfaction models of decision making
predict that an emerging decision will be accompanied by a
general shift toward a coherent position across all the points of
dispute. In other words, evaluations of the issues undergo
Presented here are results from the first experiment, in which forty-eight
people participated. These results have been obtained consistently in a number of
variations of this experiment that have been run since, with a total of over 300
participants. See Simon et al., Emergence of Coherence, supranote 54.
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change from the initial, spontaneous state that is coherent
with neither decision, towards a state of coherence with the
emerging decision. Figures 6 and 7 present the mean
evaluations of the arguments separately for the participants
who decided in favor of Smith and those who decided for Quest,
respectively. Figure 6 shows a pattern of change in the
evaluations that occurred between the vignette phase and the
legal case: the arguments that support the preferred verdict (in
favor of Smith) became stronger (mean agreement increasing
from +1.32 to +1.9) and the arguments that supported the
rejected verdict weakened (mean agreement decreasing from
+0.8 to -0.66). Thus, by the time the participants have reached
a verdict, the two argument sets are spread apart; the
arguments that support a verdict for Smith dominate the
arguments that support Quest's position. This dominance
makes for an easy and confident decision in the defendant's
favor.
Similar changes are found with participants who
decided for Quest. Figure 7 shows the same pattern of the shift
in evaluations towards coherence with the pro-Quest verdict.
Here too, relative to the fairly close evaluation of the two sets
of arguments at the vignette phase, by the conclusion of the
legal decision, the arguments supporting the chosen verdict are
deemed stronger (mean agreement increasing from +1.68 to
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+2.46) and those supporting the rejected verdict are suppressed
(mean agreement decreasing from +0.95 to -0.23). 68 The
skewed inferences translate into firm dominance of the verdict
in favor of plaintiff, accompanied by high levels of confidence.
To obtain a more detailed view of the coherence driven
changes, one can observe the shift in the evaluations of the two
analogy items: the similarity of the Internet to a telephone
system (thus invoking a precedent that supports Smith's case)
and to a newspaper (precedent cited by Quest). Figure.8 shows
that at the vignette phase, most participants agreed with both
analogies to approximately the same degree, and the
evaluation was relatively positive (all within the range of +0.82
to +1.12 on a scale ranging from -5 to +5). However, when the
same evaluations are made in the context of the case,
participants' agreement with the analogies shifts in a
predictable pattern: participants who decide in favor of Quest
come to agree much stronger with analogizing the Internet to a
newspaper and adopt a negative attitude towards the analogy
to a telephone system. Conversely, participants who decided in
favor of Smith displayed a slight increase in the analogy to a
telephone system and a significant decrease in agreement with
the analogy to a newspaper.

Although these analyses reveal a clear shift in participants' assessments of
the six points of dispute in the direction of their verdict, they do not suffice to establish
that individual participants reached a broadly coherent position across the disputed
points. It remains possible that these mean effects were caused by a single argument
rather than by imposition of coherence on the entire sets of arguments. However, if a
constraint-satisfaction process was used to reach a decision, then individual
participants would be expected to shift their assessments of most or all of the disputed
points in the direction of their eventual verdict.
For this purpose, we also performed a correlational analysis of all of the twelve
arguments and the eventual verdicts. We predicted that on the first measurement,
participants' assessments of the six positions would not constrain one another, and
hence would tend to be uncorrelated. Once the points are presented in the context of
the case, however, a constraint network would be created, the effect of which will be to
generate positive correlations among the disputed points, and between each point and
the verdict. This is the pattern we observed. In the first measurement, we found very
little correlation among the disputed points and verdict--only two of the twenty-one
correlations were significantly positive, and several were negative. This further
demonstrates that the materials created a genuine sense of complexity and ambiguity.
In contrast, in the second measurement, all but one of the correlations were
significantly positive, including all six correlations between disputed points and the
verdict; the non-significant correlation was also positive.
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The third question we addressed concerned the
participants' metacognition, specifically whether they were
aware of these coherence-driven changes. Previous research on
attitude change in social psychology has demonstrated that
people have poor awareness of changes in their attitudes and
beliefs. This conclusion is based on the finding that
participants are generally incapable of remembering the
original belief or attitude, thinking instead that the ones they
hold at the end of the process are the same as the ones they
initially held.69 This finding was borne out by our results too. In
some conditions, after participants completed the task of
making the decision, they were asked to recall the ratings that
they had given on the initial test in response to the vignettes.0
We found that the recalled evaluations were somewhere
between the evaluations on the vignettes and the evaluations
made at the end of the process; the best single predictor of the
recalled evaluations was those made at the end of the legal
case, rather than the initial ratings.71
This finding supports the belief that people tend to
perceive relative constancy in their cognitive states; they
believe that the attitudes they hold at the end of the task were
the same ones they held throughout the entire process. This
phenomenology of constancy serves to minimize or even
preclude a recognition that the positions underwent change on
69

Participants who are confronted with their original positions tend to be

genuinely surprised. In some cases, they adamantly deny the occurrence of any change.
See George R. Goethals & Richard F. Reckman, The Perception of Consistency in
Attitudes, 9 J. OF EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491-501 (1973). Findings to this effect were
first made by Asch. See Solomon Asch, Studies in the Principles of Judgments and
Attitudes: II. Determination of Judgments by Grouped and by Ego Standards, 12 J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 433, 438-39 (1940), and have been replicated in the work of Daryl Bem
& Keith McConnell, Testing the Self-Perception Explanationof DissonancePhenomena:
On the Salience of PremanipulationAttitudes, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 23,
30 (1970); Michael Ross & Ronald F. Shulinan, Increasing the Salience of Initial
Attitudes: Dissonance Versus Self-Perception Theory, 28 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 138, 142 (1973); and Dennis Wixon & James Laird, Awareness and Attitude
Change in the Forced-Compliance Paradigm: The Importance of When, 34 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 376, 382 (1976).
70 Specifically, the instructions stated, "For each question, your
goal is to state
the rating that you gave on the earlier test. Note that you should NOT give the rating
you might now believe is correct (since your opinions might have changed). Rather, you
should try your best to remember what rating you gave previously, and give that same
rating again."
1
See Holyoak & Simon, supra note 54.
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their way to the firm and virtually uniform endorsement of
subset of arguments. 2
Two additional points about this research program are
noteworthy. First, our evidence suggests that the coherence
maximizing functions actually play an important part in
driving the process, rather than being merely ex post
consequences of it.7" Second, coherence effects are not limited to
legal tasks of this nature. The same overall effects have been
found in a broad range of cognitive tasks.7 4
III.

DIscussION

In this Article I have offered a way both to conceive and
understand the debate over freedom and constraint in
adjudication. The key to the proposed conception is the
discrepancy between the openness that is apparent in the legal
materials and the judicial claim of being constrained by them,
as manifested in the example of Rogers v. Tennessee. Central to
the proposed understanding of the debate is the recognition
that closure is, to a large degree, a natural outcome of the
cognitive process involved in decision making; indeed, it is
inherent to the mechanisms that enable the decision.
A basic claim of this Article has been that the
experimental
results provide insight into a better
understanding of freedom and constraint in judicial reasoning.
As described above, the coherence professed in the Rogers
opinions is quite implausible. The five topics discussed in the
case-the separability of the Ex Post Facto doctrine from due
72See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL.
117 (1994).
73This finding is a departure from cognitive dissonance theory. See Simon et
al., Emergence of Coherence,supra note 54.
Similar findings of constraint satisfaction processes have been observed in
the making of a job choice decision in a Multi Attribute Utility decision paradigm, Dan
Simon et al., Making Multi Attribute Decisions by ConstraintSatisfaction,presented at
Meeting of Society For Judgment And Decision Making (Oct. 2000); making social
judgments about the fate of an interpersonal relationship, C. Snow, D. Simon, & S.
Read, Social Judgment by Constraint Satisfaction; (work in progress, on file with
author); and mock criminal decision tasks that require the integration of a number of
pieces of circumstantial evidence, D. Simon, C. Snow, & S. Read, Constructing Facts by
Constraint Satisfaction, Address before the Convention of American Psychological
Association (Aug. 2001).
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process; the scope of the Ex Post Facto prohibition; the
applicability of the Ex Post Facto prohibition to the judiciary;
the status of the "year and a day" rule in Tennessee; and the
fairness of the warning awarded to appellant Rogers-are
essentially separate legal questions. For the less than naive
reader, it seems striking that both opinions claim that all five
questions support the respective decisions; it is much harder to
accept that every one of the dozens of arguments aligns
perfectly to support the corresponding decisions. Implicit in the
judicial opinions is the claim that the endorsed arguments
consist of accurate, correct, and objective readings of the legal
materials, rather than ad hoc judgments made to suit the case
at hand. However suspicious this portrayal might appear, it is
difficult to devise an empirical method capable of directly
validating or refuting this crucial feature of the judicial
function. The controlled environment of a psychological
experiment, on the other hand, can provide some insight into
this question.
It cannot be taken for granted that experimental
findings are automatically applicable to the actual practice of
judicial decision making. Indeed, one might reject the
applicability of these general models of cognition to the judicial
setting and adhere instead to an approach that presumes the
autonomous nature of legal decision making. This, of course,
lies at the heart of the internal perspective towards judicial
reasoning. 5 By the terms of this approach, any external
position is required first to lift the onus and demonstrate that
it is superior to the internal perspective. But this default
position is, of course, contestable. One could well argue that
given the generality of the cognitive processes discussed here,
the burden should be on those who claim that the mental
processes employed in the judicial context are unique.
I propose that the cognitive psychology presented here
generally succeeds in capturing some important features of
judging. The research program of coherence driven decisionmaking addresses the very kind of tasks that judges face:
making discrete choices between competing courses of action
that are influenced by a complex multitude of ambiguous
inferences. The fact that these findings have been replicated
75See supra notes 9, 10.
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successfully in a range of cognitive tasks," gives good reason to
believe that it captures general and basic aspects of this type of
decision making process. It is almost too obvious to mention
Robert Cover's reminder that judges, after all, are "quite like
the rest of us."'7 While there is no doubt that the judicial
practice entails a great deal of discipline-specific expertise," it
is not at all obvious that the underlying cognitive processes are
any different. The reasoning processes of the jurist, John
Dewey argued, are similar to those of the engineer, banker,
farmer, and merchant.7 9 As Richard Posner notes, "there is no
distinctive methodology of legal reasoning."0 I have elsewhere
pointed out that many of the cognitive phenomena discussed
here can be found in the introspective writings of legal thinkers
such as Cardozo, Holmes, Posner, Hand, and Llewellyn." The
applicability of this psychological theory to the judicial practice
is further confirmed, albeit indirectly, from its correspondence
to the actual behavior of judges.
The participants in the experimental case of Quest
reported coherence that is not unlike the state of closure found
in judicial opinions. They strongly endorsed the arguments
that supported their respective decisions and rejected the
arguments that were consistent with the rejected position. The
main advantage of the experimental design is that it also
provides the same participants' evaluation of virtually the
same arguments before they became involved in deciding the
76See supranote 74.
7 Robert
Cover, The Supreme Court, i982 Term: Forward: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67 (1983). See also LEARNED HAND, How Far Is a
Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 107
(1960). Morris Cohen explained: 'we must not forget that actual law is a human
product-made and administered by judges who are not free from human
limitations in intelligence and goodwill." MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND SOCIAL
ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 337 (1933).
78 As Gary Blasi suggests in his important discussion of legal expertise, legal
experts have advantages in both the quantity of knowledge they hold and their
organization of that knowledge. Experts are better than novices in their perception and
memory of patterns and structures, and they can use their superior capabilities of
"forward" reasoning to solve problems faster. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know:
Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 313 (1995).
79See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 18 (1924).
goSee Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV.

827, 859 (1988).
"'See Psychological Model, supra note 12, at 102-21.
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legal case. Not surprisingly, no coherence is observed at that
spontaneous stage. At that point, the arguments provided
mixed support for both decisions. By the end of
the decision
making process, however, participants report distinct
coherence. In other words, the participants' evaluations of the
arguments changed from incoherence to a final state of
coherence; a state in which one decision dominates the other,
resulting in a confident choice. The best explanation for this
shift is that it is the imprint of the coherence-driven cognitive
processes that make the decision possible. It follows that the
tendency towards closure is a general cognitive feature, not a
particular quirk of the judicial profession, though I suggest
below that it is compounded with features that are specific to
the legal culture and particularly to the judicial function. 2 In
this final part of the Article I offer preliminary discussions
about three aspects of the experimental findings that are
especially significant for legal theory.
A.

Bi-DirectionalReasoning

The observed shifts towards greater coherence with the
eventual verdict manifest the principal phenomenon associated
with Gestalt theory and its progeny, constraint satisfaction
theories. Structural pressures spread throughout the network,
forcing all the elements towards a point of equilibrium at
which the arguments cohere with the chosen decision. These
shifts, borne by a glQbal coherence with the emerging result,
are what give the reasoning process its bi-directional character.
The decision is presumably driven by the inferences made from
the materials, but the materials, in turn, are changed by the
coherence-driven mechanisms. As a result, the materials lend
the decision far greater argumentative support than they
would have had absent these changes. This mental state of
exaggerated support is then reflected in the sense of closure
presented in the judicial opinion. I suggest that the source of
the critics' discontent is the claim of exaggerated closure.

See infra Part III. C.
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From a normative perspective, this criticism is quite
justified. Theories of reasoning in both law and psychology
have been heavily influenced by a number of assumptions
derived from formal accounts of deductive logic.83 A central
principle of these models is that the flow of inferences is
exclusively unidirectional. This assumption can be traced to
the logic of deductive argument, in which the task is to infer
conclusions from premises, while the premises themselves are
to be accepted as binding. Unidirectionality rules out "reverse"
inferences in which conclusions have any effect on the
evaluation of the premises. Violations of this assumption are
generally viewed as signs of the frailty of human reasoning or
of unprincipled decision-making; in the legal context, this
amounts to a violation of an avowed tenet of judicial reasoning.
Yet, to some degree, reverse influences are inherent to the
processing constraint satisfaction mechanisms.
Constraint satisfaction mechanisms bare a resemblance
to the mechanism of reflective equilibrium that is central to
John Rawls' Theory of Justice.' In searching for an
interpretation of the initial situation that accommodates one's
reasoned judgment, Rawls suggests working "from both ends,"
gradually bringing both the initial condition and the judgment
derived from it into harmony." At the end of the process, the
justification of a conception of justice is a matter of the "mutual
support of many considerations, of everything fitting together
into one coherent view."86 Gestaltian dynamics are observed
also in Frank Michelman's view of a "two way traffic" flow in

See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic For Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal
Thinking (3d ed. 1977); Evans, J. St. B. T., Bias in Human Reasoning. Causes and
Consequences (1989); L. J. Rips, The Psychology of Proof: Deductive Reasoning in
Human Thinking (1994).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2d ed. 1999).
Rawls explains:
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and
conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a
description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable
conditions and yields principles that match our considered judgments
duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective
equilibrium.
RAWLS, supranote 84, at 18.
'Id. at 19.
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the relationship between moral theory and legal thought.' The
empirical findings made in the coherence experiments seem
quite consistent with these philosophical theories.
It must be acknowledged, however, that while reflective
equilibrium might be regarded as an accurate account of
decision making and a desirable methodology for resolving
questions of moral philosophy, its suitability as a theory of
judging is less than obvious. The strength and integrity of
reflective equilibrium are in its forthright acknowledgment of
its inherent bi-directionality. As Rawls explains, the process is
as much about justifying one's convictions of social justice as it
is about conceptualizing the original position.88 This avowed bidirectionality is patently inconsistent with the current
conventions of judicial reasoning. Whether it can be
conceptually made to fit into the judicial function is a question
left for further examination.
B.

JudicialPhenomenology

As discussed above, the coherence experimentation
suggests that constraint satisfaction mechanisms operate
absent conscious control and without awareness. Specifically,
people do not notice that their evaluations of the materials
change throughout the process from an initial state of conflict
and ambiguity towards a final state of coherence and certainty.
As stated above, these findings are consistent with previous
research on attitude-change in social psychology.89 They are
consistent also with a recent body of research that shows that
higher level mental processes-including goal pursuit,
judgment, and interpersonal behavior-can occur in the
absence of conscious choice, deliberation, or guidance. 90 This
See Frank I. Michelman, Legalism and Humankind, in THE GOOD LIFE AND
THE HUMAN GOOD 190 (Elen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1992). Michelman suggests the
"two way traffic" models apply also to the relationship between high-level prescription
and specific understandings of human nature. For another application of similar
notions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation,100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
RAWLS, supranote 84, at 17.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
For a review, see John A. Bargh & Melissa J. Ferguson, Beyond
Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of HigherMental Processes, 126 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 925

(2000).
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lack of awareness suggests that, from a phenomenological
perspective, people's reports of closure are largely genuine.
This point is of particular importance for an
understanding not only of the judicial function, but also of the
judiciary's critics. It suggests that the professed dominance of
the chosen verdict is not necessarily contrived or otherwise
disingenuous; it can be assumed that in some-perhaps most
-situations, judges describe the arguments as compelling
because that is the way they actually perceive the materials at
the end of the decision-making process. Sensitivity to the
judges' subjective experience thus puts into question one of the
most persistent and acerbic criticisms of judging. The
dubiousness of the professed closure in light of the apparent
openness need not lead to the conclusion of judicial bad faith; it
can be better understood as a phenomenologically genuine
modification of the materials. In this context, I am in complete
agreement with Winter's effort to fill in the excluded middle.9
While the judicial account of closure is largely incorrect, judges
are not bad faith actors. To criticize the judicial function, one
need to examine the phenomenology of judging in light of what
the research teaches about the consciousness of mental
processing.
C.

Confidence, Credibility,and Persuasion

One possible conclusion from the research is that the
very features of constraint satisfaction processes that make
them an effective way of executing the decision-making task,
might hinder the subsequent task of communicating the
decision to other audiences. In other words, the concern is that
the internal experience of dominance and the ensuing
confidence could be unpersuasive to third parties.92 As it turns
out, this concern has little effect outside the limited circle of
judicial critics, as evidenced, inter alia, by the prevalence and
persistence of this style of reasoning. The legal profession as a
whole, not to mention the broader citizenry, show no aversion
to the judicial claims to closure. Most readers of judicial
91WINTER, supra note 1, at 158.
92 On the important connection between the cognitive processes and their
persuasiveness, see WINTER, supra note 1, at 152-53.
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opinions are apparently willing to accept the professed
constraint and inevitability even though it is quite apparent
that the legal materials do not compel the chosen decision.
They are willing to accept it even in the face of a dissenting
opinion that is diametrically opposed on virtually every
argument, and professes to be inevitably constrained by the
same legal materials.
There is preliminary empirical evidence that people in
general are not particularly insistent on well-reasoned
elaborations, and that they even display a preference for onesided arguments of complex issues.93 Thus it is quite possible
that the judicial style of closure has persisted because the
imprints of the judges' cognitive processes are compatible with
the inclinations of their audiences. Indeed, there might be
more than a mere coincidence here. Given the central role
played by judicial reasoning in forging the argumentative
conventions of the legal culture,94 it should not be surprising
that the legal community has come to perceive closure as the
normal and proper style of judicial argument. Indeed, the
occasional admissions of openness in an opinion seem to be met
with overt dissatisfaction,95 whereas criticism of closure is
In an experiment by Jonathan Baron, participants were presented with
texts containing arguments supporting different positions on the topic of abortion.
Some of the texts contained only arguments supporting one side of the issue, while
other texts contained two-sided arguments. The participants were asked to "evaluate
the thinking" of the person who wrote those arguments. Participants were specifically
admonished to focus on the quality of the reasoning. The interesting finding was that
participants gave significantly higher rating to texts containing one-sided arguments
than to those that offered arguments supporting both sides of the issue. This finding
was true regardless of the participants' own opinions on the topic. See Jonathan Baron,
Myside Bias in Thinking About Abortion, 7 THINKINGAND REASONING 221-35 (1995).
On the centrality of the judicial opinion in the development of legal
discourse, see James Boyd White, Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAw 110 (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 101-02 (1990).
95For example, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), Justice Breyer concluded that none of the available
paradigmatic standards of free speech-broadcast, common carrier, or bookstoreseemed to fit the case of a local cable television system. Id. at 741-42. Noting the rapid
changes taking place in the world of communications, Breyer stated that it would be
"unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words,"
id. at 742, and proceeded to decide the case on narrower grounds. The interesting point
here is that this admission of openness evoked reactions from his brethren justices and
legal commentators. His position was congratulated by three justices (Souter, Stevens,
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rarely found outside the limited circle of critical academics. 98 It
is quite plausible, then, that the imprints of the cognitive
process influence not only the way opinions are written, but
also the way in which we generally perform legal argument.'

and O'Connor), see id. at 768, 777, 779-80, but criticized by Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg for being standard-less, for losing sight with the doctrine-in short, for being
"adrift." Id. at 780-81. All this could have been prevented, these Justices admonish,
had the court had "the discipline" to adhere more closely to existing doctrinal
propositions. Id. at 780. This frank, and rather mild, judicial statement by Justice
Breyer sparked an article in the New York Times, entitled When a JusticeSuffers From
Indecision. The article included a comment by Floyd Abrams, a leading First
Amendment practitioner, who found the decision "disturbing." Abrams explained:
"[Wihen the Court deliberately avoids the use of legal doctrine, it means you don't
know what the law is." See Linda Greenhouse, When a Justice Suffers FromIndecision,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1996, at D5. Similar criticism was made by the former general
counsel to the Federal Communications Commissioner, Bruce Fein. Writing for the
American Lawyer News Service, Fein stated: "Only a judge whose mental faculties
have fossilized could not smuggle in personal free speech predilections under Breyer's
non-standard standard." TEX. LAW., July 22, 1996, at 25.
A similar response followed a recent case in which the Delaware Chancery
Court issued an unusual order forcing one company to purchase its merger partner for
a mere $3 billion. Explaining the decision in this high stake case, Judge Leo Strine Jr.
admitted to have been "confessedly torn" and uncertain about a number of issues
involved. One legal observer expressed concern to the Wall Street Journal over the
decision "because equivocating in writing doesn't inspire confidence." See Robin Sidel,
Deals & Deal Makers: Leo Strine Issues Rulings, and Entertains His Audiences, as
Judge on Takeover Case, WALL STREET J., June 26, 2001, at C1.
To be sure, there must also be instances of the opposite criticism. I have
come across one such example. A report by the Chicago Council of Lawyers reviewing
members of the bar's opinions of the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit expresses
serious criticism of one of the Court's judges, John L. Coffey. One of the central
criticisms is that the Judge's opinions are "almost invariably written forcefully in favor
of a particular result and they also typically treat that result as being clear and beyond
dispute. . . . Judge Coffey's opinions rarely acknowledge serious factual or legal
uncertainties, however. These problems are exacerbated by Judge Coffey's tendency to
go too far in attempting to prove that a given result is the right one for every
conceivable reason." See Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States
Court ofAppeals For the Seventh Circuit,43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 732 (1994). It should
be noted that in this case, the council expressed concerns also with the apparent
influence of Judge Coffey's "personal values and biases" on his performance as well as
with his poor interpersonal relations. Id. at 734. It is not obvious that the criticism of
the Judge's style would have been made had the council not had substantive
complaints against him.
97 I have elsewhere discussed the problems that are caused
by this discursive
style. See, PsychologicalModel, supra note 12, at 127-34.
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CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings and conclusions presented in this Article
might be somewhat disconcerting, even for the critical observer
who agrees that excessive closure is hardly a desirable style of
judicial reasoning. Given that coherence effects occur absent
conscious control and without awareness, recasting the
jurisprudential debate as hinging on cognitive psychological
phenomena might invite a pessimistic response. This depiction
seems to leave little prospect for reform.
It must be emphasized, however, that the cognitive
phenomena discussed here are not invariant nor completely
insular. Gestaltian psychologists have long insisted that
mental processing is always sensitive to environmental
contexts, or the psychological fields, within which the behavior
is performed." Indeed, cognitive phenomena vary across
cultures and contexts.' 0 Thus, judicial coherence is a function
not only of the basic cognitive mechanisms and of a number of
task-related characteristics-including the need to make
binary judgments' and the desire to terminate the state of
indecision'--it is sensitive also to the legal culture and to
judicial role expectations. In the current legal atmosphere,
coherence seems to be exacerbated by the belief that closure is
broadly seen as a factor that enhances the acceptability of the
98 I have elsewhere argued that excessive closure has a corrosive effect on the

judicial decision making process in that it endorses too much and criticizes too much; it
obfuscates rather than clarifies difficult legal questions; it dampens the tendency to
fully explore the issues at stake; and it might also have an adverse effect on the type of
people who join and excel on the bench. See PsychologicalModel, supra note 12, at 12733.
See Kurt Lewin, The Dynamic Theory of Personality (1935).
'0 See e.g., Steven Heine & Darrin Lehman, Culture, Dissonance, and SelfAffirmation, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 389 (1997); see also Kaiping
Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics,and ReasoningAbout Contradiction,54
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 741-54 (1999).
10' Judges highlight the general fact that their task is "to decide, not to
debate." HAND, supra note 77 at 131. Jerome Frank stated that legal argument is
affected by the fact that "lawyers, more than most men, are compelled to reconcile
incompatibles." JEROME FRANK, MODERN MIND, 33 (1930).
'0 Posner speaks of judges' aversion to wallowing in uncertainty and regrets.
Following Pierce, he states "people hate being in a state of doubt and will do whatever
is necessary to move from doubt to belief." Posner, supra note 80, at 873. On the effect
of tension on decision making, see IRVING JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 45-54 (1976).
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decision and promotes the institutional legitimacy of the
court.10 3 This, however, need not be the case. One can imagine a
different legal culture that would be conducive to a somewhat
different style of reasoning."° For its part, cognitive psychology
should facilitate reform by providing a richer understanding of
the coherence effects, specifically, by identifying the conditions
that would enable judges to be more responsive to both the
freedom and the constraint involved in adjudication.

For example, Posner suggests that, like all other people, judges want "to
diffuse responsibility for their unpopular, controversial, or simply most consequential
actions, and they do this by persuading themselves that their decisions are dictated by
law, rather than the result of choice." Posner, supranote 80, at 873.
104 1 have offered a preliminary sketch of one possible cultural alternative. See
PsychologicalModel, supra note 12, at 137-41.
103

